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NATURE OF

TH~

CASE

Plaintiff - Respondent accepts statement of Defendant - AppelL
adding only that the covenant not to compete was an integral part of a sa
and purchase agreement of a business for the sum of One Hundred

Ninety-T~

Thousand Dollars.
DISPOSITION lfl LO\,/ER COURT
The District Court for Salt Lake County held the death of Sell<
Hyman Rudd, (Plaintiff-Respondent) did not terminate the obligation of Bu)
Mel Parks, (Defendant-Appellant) to make payments set forth in a covenant
to compete which is a part of an integrated contract to buy and sell a bus
iness for an agreed price of $192,000.00.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have decision of District Court
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Through correspondence initiated by Defendant-Appellant (Rudd)
consisting of three letters (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) Deceased, Hyman Rudd,
entered into a firm agreement to sell his business to Defendant-Appellant,
Mel Parks, (Parks) for the sum of $192,000.00 and Mr. Parks accepted.
The letter dated September 19, 1973, stipulating the terms oft
sale, drafted by Defendant-Appellants, provided the "Total Purchase price"
at $192,000.00 and would be allocated in specific included amounts to thre
items.
Shortly prior to sale, deceased Seller, the father of two minor
high school age children (Melinda and Jeffery) had a serious heart attack,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and this was his reason to sell.
(R 255-256, Lns. 27-10)

Both facts were known to Appellant, Parks

Mr. Rudd died of an acute heart attack on October 29,

1975.
Plaintiff-Respondent accepts all factual statements of DefendantAppellant not contradictory to the foregoing.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

I I.

THE AGREEMENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, BUYER, AND DECEASED
SELLER IS A SINGLE, EtlTJ RE, INTEGRATED CONTRACT SUPPORTED
BY A SINGLE CONSIDERATION A STATED SINGLE PURCHASE OF
$192,000, FORMALIZED IN THREE INSTRUMENTS AT THE DESIGN
OF THE BUYER, WITH MONEY ALLOCATIOrlS TO EACH ARBITRARILY
DETERMlrlED BY BUYER AFTER HIS CONSULTATION \./ITH AND
ADVICE OF A TAX ADVISER.
MR. RUDD, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HEIRS HAVE
FULLY OBSERVED THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE.

I 11.

SELLER DRE\-/ THE CONTRACT, PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT OF A
TOTAL SUM, AND IN COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE STATED THE
PROVISIONS ARE TO APPLY TO AND BIND THE HEIRS, EXECUTORS AND ASSIGNS, AND SAID CONTRACT SHOULD BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST DRAFT OR, \>/HO SHOULD NOT BE RELi EVED
FROM HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY BY AN ACT OF GOD.

IV.

BOTH FACTS AND LAW REQUIRE IN EQUITY THE AFFIRMATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LO\./ER COURT TO PREVENT FORFEITURE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AGREEMENT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, BUYER, AND DECEASED
SELLER IS A SINGLE, ENTIRE, INTEGRATED CONTRACT SUPPORTED
BY A SINGL': CONSIDERATIO~l A STATED SINGLE PURCHASE OF
$192, 000, FORMAL! ZED IN THREE INSTRUMENTS AT THE DES I GN
OF THE BUYER, WITH MONEY ALLOCATIONS TO EACH ARBITRARILY
DETERMINED BY BUYER AFTER HIS CONSULTATION WITH AND
ADVICE OF A TAX ADVISER.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 consists of letters between Defendant-

Appellant as offerer and deceased Seller as final acceptor.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant's First offer, dated September 6, 1973, was for $180,0C
with included sums allocated to stipulated items within the assets of a
business.
Appellant's Second offer, Dated September 19, 1973, was for $192,
with a change in value allocations calculated to bestow greatest benefit
to Buyer.

The tax detriments to the Seller almost nullify the $12,000

purchase price increase.
Appellant's
lst Offer
$180,000

Appellant's
2nd Offer
Inc.

$192,000

Goodwill:
$15,000
Covenant Not To Compete:
65,000
100,000
Equipment:
Interest:
6 1/2% on unpaid bal.

Inc.

$15,000
95,000
82,000
Included in $192,000

The tax consequences of the change has a traumatic negative impac
on the net returns of the Seller and a positively beneficial result for the
Buyer.

The capital gains return to Seller was reduced by lessening the valu

of the equipment and the portion taxed to the Seller as ordinary income
increased by increasing the amount allocated to the Covenant Not To Compete.
It is an arbitrary change in value determination.

Since the

Covenant Not To Compete protects the good will (capital assets), how does
Buyer, the Defendant-Appellant, justify the $30,000 increase in value of
the non-compete element without an increase in value of the good will element?

Further, there was an actual decrease in the value of the quipment

schedule (Capital Gain to Seller) to meet Seller's demand of a $12,000 increase in Total Purchase Price to $192,000.

It is apparent from these nego·

tiations that the business was valued as a whole and the allocations were
arbitrarily determined for tax purposes.
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The Transcript establishes that the changes were calculated by
Buyer to his advantage.

Appellant testified his tax adviser established the

final $95,000 value for the Non-Compete Agreement so he could deduct that
sum as an operating expense, and without this allocation, he would not buy.
(R 254 Ln 9 to end and R 255 to Ln 19)

"That was the only terms on which I

would buy".
At the time of the deliberations, the effect of the death of
Rudd on the performance of the contract never entered Parks' mind - "Didn't
think anything about death" (R 3Lf2 Lns 19; R 250 and 251 Lns 147).
The purpose of a non-compete covenant is to protect the good will
of a business.

Allen vs. Rose Park Pharmacy 120 U, 608; 237 P2d 823, and

Appellant's Brief page 16).
How does he then justify as reasonable a $95,000 value for the
protection of a business asset whose value he assesses for tax purposes at
only $15,000?
How does Defendant-Appellant justify almost 50% of the total
purchase of a business to protect its good 1-li 11 (one of its inc 1uded assets
whose value is less than 8% of the purchase price)?
A $95,000 purchase price for the covenant not to compete buys
Appellant no more protection insofar as recovery for breach is concerned than
$60,000.

Unlike insurance, increase of premium does not increase coverage.
There is no stipulation for 1 iquidated damages and if Rudd has

violated the contract, Defendant-Appellant's recourse would not have been
refusal to make contract payments, but he would have been entitled to recover
as damages only loss of profits.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The consideration for the covenant was the principal sum of
$95,000 but such sum, as an accommodation to the Buyer, was payable over a
period of time to spread the payments over a period of years.
POI NT 11
MR. RUDD, HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HEIRS HAVE
FULLY OBSERVED THE COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE.
This contract is not analogous to a contract requiring affirmativ
personal services such as the contract of a singer or dancer.

Obviously,

the contract of a singer or dancer is terminated on death since that person
can no longer perform the services required and it is well settled that the
impossibility of performance terminates the contract.
In this case, Mr. Rudd was not required to do an affirmative act
but to refrain from performing acts.
With one notable exception, human experience indicates that Mr.
Rudd will not return from death to establish a competing business.

Mr.

Rudd has in fact performed the ultimate act that assures and guarantees the
Defendant-Appellant that his good will is secure from competition by Mr.
Rudd!
Those cases and authorities cited by Appellant's Counsel to indicate that performance is discharged by death relate to performance or to
exclusive rights for performance and are not applicable to this situation.
17 Am Jur 2d page 829, refers to "The prevention by an act of God
of full performance of the entire contract. .. " whereas in this case, full
observance is assured by the act of God.
There is no specific provision in the covenant relating to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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effect of the death of the Covenantor (Rudd) and the general authority is
stated as fol lm·1s:

17A Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts page 626,

11

Hm·1ever, it has been said that, with a few
exceptions, contracts do not die with the
contractor unless they contain a provision to
that effect; and a contract will be construed
as subject to an implied condition of survivorship only when the continued existence of a
party is ass urned as the basis of the agreement. 11
17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts page 865,
"The test for determining whether a particular
contract is discharged by death has been said
to be whether it is of such a character that it
may be performed by the promiser's personal
representative ... ''
In the instant case, the personal representative of the deceased has exclusive
right to the name of the deceased and she and/or the heirs could have entered
a competing business or could have refrained from so doing.

They and each of

them refrained, and therefore the contract has been fully observed.
POINT I I I
SELLER DREW THE CONTRACT, PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT OF A
TOTAL SUM, AND IN COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE STATED THE
PROVISIONS ARE TO APPLY TO AND BIND THE HEIRS, EXECUTORS AND ASS I GllS, AND SAi D COMTRACT SHOULD BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AGAINST DRAFTOR, WHO SHOULD NOT BE RELIEVED
FROM HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY BY AN ACT OF GOD.
Mr. Parks (Defendant-Appel I ant) in drafting the instrument that is
the subject of this case, could have provided that Mr. Rudd would receive a
certain payment for each month in 1·1hich he did not compete until the death
of Mr. Rudd and that the contract would terminate on death and not be payable
to the heirs, executors and assigns.

Mr. Parks did not avail himself of these

alternatives, but to the contrary provided for the payment of the sum of
$95,000 and for his convenience made the sum payable in monthly installments
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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over a period of years to a given specific date.

Mr. Parks further provided

that the contract was binding on the heirs, executors and assigns of the
parties.
The Covenant Not to Compete in essence combines t1,10 agreements:
l.

A Promissory note in the amount of $95,000 payable to
Mr. Rudd, his heirs and assigns, and payable in installmen

2.

An agreement of Mr. Rudd not to compete with Mr. Parks.

If Mr. Parks had paid the $95,000 coincidentally with the executio
of the contract rather than conveniencing himself by making the payments over
a period of time, then, assuming, arguendo, that the death of Mr. Rudd was a
breach of contract, Mr. Parks would have to attend the Court and show the
da1nages incurred by Mr. Parks as a result of the untimely death of Mr.
Rudd.

Such damages, if any there were, may or may not have been equal to

the sum of $1,500 per month.

It is not equitable for Mr. Pad;s to now claim

that because he, in drafting his contracts, developed for himself a convenient payment program, that the monthly payments constitute an agreement in
relation to 1 iquidated damages.
The Trial Court found the intent of the parties at the time of
signing was to create a package deal as a result of which Buyer got all he
dealt for and he should pay a full purchase price of $192,000; $95,000 of
which was attributed, for the tax and business purposes of the Buyer, to a
covenant not to compete (R 192, 193 and Findings of Fact 13 and 14).
The Court concluded, "The entire Contract of Sale of the Salt Lake
Sanitation Business was one contract involving a total consideration of

$192,000 which consideration for business purposes and tax benefits of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Buyer, was divided into three parts, and the Defendant is not excused from
the payment of any portion of the purchase price."
Argument supporting Points I and I I are adequate to establish the
premise of Point I I I as it applies to the instant case.
Reference to the Covenant Not to Compete instrument itself (Exhibit
lP) gives additional support.
The instrument is dated October 1, 1973 and stipulates non-competition
"For a period of five years from the date hereof".
It stipulates payment of $95,000.
the first three months.

No payments were required for

The first payment of $6ji.OQOCwas required on January

20, 1974, and thereafter, monthly installments of $1 ,500 on the 20th day of
each successive month until the purchase price was paid in full.

The time

periods are not identical date intervals and show them to be totally independent and severed of each other.

The totality of the amount due and the

specified final date of payment give proof of the totality and indivisibility
of the payment in this instrument.

This covenant falls within the framework

of an entire agreement with a total six figure price of $192,000.
This instrument further stipulates, "It is expressly understood
that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors
and administrators of the respective parties".
The law requires every effort must be made to give reasonable
interpretation to a contract and must strictly construe against the party
drawing it (Guinand vs. Walton 22 U2d 196; 450 P2d 467) especially if a
forfeiture is involved, \1ingets, Incorporated vs. Bitters 28 U2d 231; 500 P2d
1007.

It follrn·1s that this sentence particularly highlighted by its intro-

duction means that the Estate of Hy Rudd will pay damages to the Buyer to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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compensate for acts of competition by the minor children of the Seller should
he die during the five years.
The Court found the children had not competed (Findings of Fact
[Rl92] Finding #10).
Ul1nann vs. Sunset-McKee Co., March 1955 9th Circuit, 221 Fed 2d
128, supports the judgment here.

The parties in the Trial Court stipulated

deceaased was to refrain from competition during the three years he was to
draw a monthly pension, after he completed a working career with Sunset-McKee.
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court which upheld Company's
refusal to pay after employee's death declaring;
Page 132. "But the Court chooses prirnari ly to
uphold the contract as binding for the reason that
the consideration to support the Company 1s obligation is to be found in Ulmann, Sr. being required not to compete by soliciting for any other
employer his so called 'protected accounts' ... "
The cases cited by Defendant-Appellant are readily distinguishable
from the matter here, and are not entitled to consideration.
First case is Keller vs. California Liquid Gas, August, 1973 Wyo.,
363 Fed Supp 123.

Defendant, California Gas Co. bought two businesses, a

wholesale liquid gas company and a liquid gas appliance company from the
Sellars.

Terms of sale of the business are not stated in the Covenant Not to

Compete nor are they referred to in any "''ay.

Ancillary to the sale of the

above businesses, Sellers, by separate agreement, also entered into a 10 year
non compete agreement by sellers for which buyers were to pay $100,000 in 10
yearly installments of $10,000 each, on October 30th of each succeeding year.
Sellers crashed in an air accident the year fol lowing sale.
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Central to Court's decision was the fact that the children of the
deceased who are co-plaintiffs, had aggressively competed against defendant.
The Court, treating this fact, declared:
Page 128. ''The right to specific performance depends
upon circumstances and conditions in addition to the
existence of a valid contract. Though the contract
be free from fraud, mistake or other feature that
would authorize a Court to set it aside, equitable
relief may be denied if in acting under it plaintiffs
have resorted to unfair conduct. These are all
expressions commonly used in elaboration of the
hoary maxim, 'He who comes into equity must come
with clean hands' ••• Plaintiffs would ask the
Court to allow them to compete against the Defendant while still requiring payments under a
covenant, which as shown, has ceased to exist.
The Court cannot be party to such an unconscionab 1e bargain."
It dealt with the death issue terminative of the not to

co~~ete

clause because these were frowned upon as in restraint of trade.
The Keller contract was not entire in the sense that it was
integrated with the other elements of the purchase in a single price.
The Keller case further made no provision about heirs and
administrators as the instant case.
Interesting is the observation of the Circuit Court in the
Ulmann case (supra):

.

Page 133. 11 \~hile always a court must seek to dlitvine
the intent of the parties, it may be doubtful if
the parties here ever put their minds to the
question of 'Suppose Ulmann Sr. dies', yet the
underlying tenor of the agreement seems to be
that the Company ~1as willing to reward Ulmann,
Sr. with a total of ~5,400 payable in 36 installments of $150 each ••• "
Also, (8,9)" ••• If the construction of the agreement
here (which seems to have been designed and executed
by the sales department) is an unsatisfactory one for
Sunset-McGee, it is a matter within the company's
correct
indigitization
drawing
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but if there is a doubt, the employee (or
if the e::iployer selects the word>, should
advantage of his boss's language which is
tible of t1,10 intrinsically reasonable but
site constructions." (Emphasis added)

his estate),
fiave the
suscepoppo-

In Jones vs. Servel, Inc., Indiana, 1962, 186 NE (2) 689, the
deceased was not only not to compete during the relevant period, but was al
required to perform affirmatively:
Page 691. "You 1,1ill ••• act in an advisory capacity,
as a consultant to this corporation and any of its
subsidiaries in connection with any matters relative
to the business and affairs of said corporations, it
being understood that you will hold yourself available
to render the services which are required of you
hereunder and wil 1 not engage in any other business
or activities ••• or maintain a place of residence,
which in any case unreasonably interferes with
performance by you hereunder ••• "
This argument included serving on Board of Directors and officer of any
subsidiary to which he might be elected.
The facts of Jones vs. Joy tlanufacturing, Mo. 1964, 381 SH 2d 86:
involves a contract of employment whereby,
Page 862. ""Joy hereby agrees to continue the
employment of Jones in the position of District
Manager of its Coal Machinery Division •.• during
the term and subject to the provisions of this
agreement. 11
Jones died during the life of the contract.
In the context of the facts, we, too, can endorse Appellant's
quote.

(Appellant's Brief, page 25). Obviously, the ability to perform the

affirmative acts terminated on his death.
POltlT IV
BOTH FACTS AND LAW REQUIRE IN EQUITY THE AFFIRMATION
OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT TO PREVENT FORFEITURE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
Seller's heart trouble knrn,rn to Buyer motivated sale and permitti
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Buyer to allocate values arbitrarily to items constituting Seller's business
to Buyer's best tax interest without relation to actual values of elements.
The Trial Courts Findings supported by the evidence carries its
O\'ln

dignity.
From the standpoint of equity, if death as an act of God excuses

perf~rmance then a judgment should not require a forfeiture, when a deliberate

breach entails only such damages as the aggrieved party could prove.

Carried

to a logical conclusion, neither the decedent seller with heart attack, so
knmm by buyer, 1-1ho had sold with arbitrary values imposed by the buyer,
nor that buyer who claims he hadn't given a thought to the death of the
seller at the time of entering into the contract, could contend it was the
intent of the parties that buyer be absolved from payment if seller died.
Against the backdrop of buyer's drawing non compete instrument dated October
l, 1973 with the initial payment due January 20, 1974, is it reasonable to
accept Defendant's contention that buyer was relieved of the obligation to
pay any

consideratio~~eller

were to have died on January 19, 1974?

An act of God having excused the observance of this negative
covenant, it is incumbent on the Court to determine the equities of both
parties in terms of benefits received as well as services performed.
Although this is not a proper instance of frustration, Castagna
vs. Church, Utah, Aug. 1976; 552 P2d 1282, states a principle regarding
damages which does equity here:
Page 1284. "If it was foreseeable there should
have been provision for it in the contract, and
the absence of such a provision gives rise to
the inference that the risk was assumed."

" •.. a vendee has the right to insist upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is
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able to perform with an abatement in the purchase
price equal to the value of the deficiency or
defect."
and, the Defendant-Appellant has proved no damage.
To find for Defendant-Appellant would require a finding that the
parties impliedly agreed that Seller's remaining alive

wa~

a condition pre-

cedent to Buyer's monthly payment and that the liquidated agreed darr.ages wer
equal to the unpaid portion of the price.
tv10

ne~~

The Court by so doing would graft

provisions in the contract neither of which was in the contemplatior.

of the parties.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff-Appellant agrees "There is no question that the parties
intended that a covenant not to compete be a part of a sales transaction bet
Hyrum Rudd a.1d Mel Parks", as stated in Appellant's Brief (Conclusion).

The

is no question that Parks offered $180,000 and when this was refused, offe"

$192,000 which was accepted.

There is no question, the included value elen

was maneuvered by Parks under expert tax guidance without regard to value of
the constituting assets of the business; without concern or thought to the
consequences of the death of Hy Rudd, though he knew of Rudd's state of
health, but only with concern for beneficial tax consequences to the Buyer.
If Appellant 1 s intent was not to continue payments after the deal
of Rudd, he could have removed the uncertainty from the provision when he
wrote the instrument.
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Trial
sitting as a court of equity should be affirmed.
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DATED this _ _ day of Ap ri 1, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

BERNARD L. ROSE

,/

/

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the Brief of Plaint
and Respondent of Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court, Case No. 15491 to the Attorney for the Defendant and Appellant by
hand delivering the same on this

day of April, 1978, to Vaughn H.

North, 10 West First South, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

RECEIVED AND ACCEPTED

(s i gna tu re)
(Date)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

